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ADVERSE POSSESSION-TITLE BY INNOCENT MISTAKEN OccUPATIoN.-The defen-
dant for more than twenty years occupied to a wall which she had mistakenly built
beyond the true boundary between her land and the plaintiff's. Within the statu-
tory period the defendant explicitly disclaimed intention of wanting any land that
did not belong to her. Held, that the defendant had gained title by open, continu-
ous, exclusive, and adverse occupation. Van Allen v. Sweet (1921, Mass.) 132
N. E. 348.
The case is an excellent example of the better rule. See COMMENTS (1921) 31
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 195.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-IGNORANCE OF COUNSEL AS GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL.-
The defendant was tried for a serious crime. His attorney displayed gross ignor-
ance of certain rules of evidence, with the result that the accused was gravely
prejudiced. Held, that there should be a new trial. People v. Schulnan (1921,
Ill.) 132 N. E. 530.
In civil cases, ignorance of counsel is not reversible error. Quinn v. Wetherbee
(1871) 41 Calif. 247. Nor will the appellate court in any case grant relief for the
mere negligent omission of an attorney who is presumably competent. Bowman
v. Field (1881) 9 Mo. App. 576. In criminal cases, however, a new trial will be
allowed where it appears that the defendant has been prejudiced as a result of
extraordinary ignorance on the part of his counsel. State v. Jones (1882) 12 Mo.
App. 93; see Milburn, Curious Cases (19o2) 94.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE VESTING IN
MAYOR DISCRETIONARY POWER TO GRANT PERMITS TO HOLD MEETINGS IN PUBLIC
STREETS.-The City of Mount Vernon, acting within its charter, passed an Ordi-
nance prohibiting public meetings in the City's streets without a permit from the
Mayor. The relators, all Socialists, having been arrested for an admitted violation
of the Ordinance, sought their release in habeas corpus proceedings, alleging the
Ordinance to be unconstitutional. Held, that the Ordinance was constitutional
even though there might have been unfair discrimination in the instant case.
(Pound, J., dissenting). People v. Doyle (1921) 232 N. Y. 96.
A contrary result was reached in a recent Connecticut case. State v. Coleman
(1921, Conn.) 133 At. 385. It was adversely criticized in COMMENTS (1921) 31
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 183, 187. And .he New York Court of Appeals expressly
refused to follow it In the instant case, the dissenting judge, while admitting that
the Ordinance was originally valid, maintained that its discriminatory administra-
tion made it no longer so. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct
1O64. That decision, if applied to its full extent, would have necessitated holding
the Mount Vernon Ordinance invalid from its inception, which none of the
learned judges were willing to do. And rightly so, for, as pointed out in the
comment on the Coleman Case referred to above, what is proper regulation of the
use of public property may not be at all proper in the regnlation of the use of
private property. A court should hesitate to declare an ordinance, valid on its
face, invalid because of an unfortunate discrimination in its administration. In
the Yick Wo Case, as in the instant case, the offenders might have been released
without reference to the validity of the ordinance. But in that case, the malad-
ministration was so glaringly flagrant that the Supreme Court was led to declare
the ordinance there involved unconstitutional. In the present case, however, the
normal appeal from the Mayor's decision would have been fully adequate.
KANSAS INDUSTRIAL COURT-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCT
OF PACKING BUSINESS.-In the settlement of a trade dispute between a small
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meat-packing concern and its employees, the Kansas Industrial Court formulated
certain regulations for the conduct of the plant, fixing wages and working hours.
Upon a refusal by the concern to obey these regulations, the Court instituted
mandamus proceedings to compel it to do so. One ground of defence was that the
orders could not be enforced without depriving the company of its property with-
out due process of law. Held, that the regulations were constitutional. Court of
"Industrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Co. (1921, Kan.) 2oi Pac. 418.
The regulations imposed upon this concern by the Industrial Court are discussed
in (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2o6. In the present proceedings, the Court
avoided the charge of unconstitutionality by holding that the company could not be
compelled to operate at a loss, and that there was, therefore, no taking of property
without due process. This novel institution has thus successfully escaped one
more attempt to destroy it. See COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 75.
RECEIVERS-PRIORITY OF RECEIVERS' CERTIFICATES OVER PRIOR LiENs.-The plain-
tiff filed a bill, as creditor, for the appointment of receivers to carry on a business
in their discretion, against the defendant, a private corporation, organized to carry
out a contract with the City of New York for the disposal of its garbage. The
receiver appointed" borrowed money and issued receivers' certificates which, by the
order of the court, were to take priority over all other liens of the defendant The
trustee of the first mortgage appeared and objected; its objection being overruled,
it did not appeal. The receiver failed to make a profit and discontinued the busi-
ness. The prior lienholders foreclosed their mortgage. Held, that the lien of the
trustee under the first mortgage upon the foreclosure fund was paramount. Ameri-
can Enginkering Co. v. Metropolitan By-Products Co. (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 275
Fed. 34.
A court may give priority over prior liens to receivers' certificates when their
issue was necessary for the preservation of the property. McDermitt v. Pentress
Gas Co. (1918) 82 W. Va. 230, 95 S. E. 841. Receivers' certificates issued to
obtain money to pay taxes are made first liens. It Re J. B. & J. M. Cornell Co.(19z2, S. D. N. Y.) 201 Fed. 381. And when the continuance of the business of a
public or quasi-public corporation is indispensable to the public welfare, existing
liens may be subordinated to receivers' certificates. See Internatonal Trust Co. v.
Decker Bros. (19o7, C. C. A. 9th) 152 Fed. 78; 28 Ann. Cas. 4o, note. But in
the case of a private corporation which is operated under a receiver for profit, prior
lienholders who do not consent cannot be deprived of their liens in favor of those
who have advanced money on receivers' certificates. It Re I. B. & J. M. Cornell
Co., supra; Clark, Receivers (1918) sec. 851; High, Receivers (1876) sec. 138
The instant case seems to fall within this rule.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENT-IELIANCE ON VOLUNTARY CONTRI-
BUTIONS.-The deceased had voluntarily contributed six dollars a week on' the
average to the support of his sister, who relied on these contributions for her
support. The sister brought an action under the Workmen's Compensation Act
to recover for the death of her brother. Held, that she was a dependent within
the meaning of the Act and could recover. Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co. (1921,
Conn.) 114 Atl. 1O9.
Compensation statutes ordinarily do not undertake to define the term "depen-
dency," and hence definitions given and applications made have not always been
uniform. But it is generally held that if there is a dependency in fact upon
certain contributions even though they were given voluntarily and not because of a
legal duty to do so, the one relying on these contributions is a dependent within the
meaning of the Compensation Act. Jackson v. Erie Ry. (1914, Sup. Ct.) 86
N. J. L. 550, 91 Atl. 1035; Waltz v. Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp. (1915)
170 App. Div. 6, 158 N. Y. Supp. 883; Jacksol v. Industrial CLmnission (1916)
164 Wis. 94, 159 N. W. 561.
